As 2025 attracts to an in depth, the MENA area finds itself at a pivotal second, nonetheless grappling with long-standing crises and solely tentative makes an attempt at stabilisation. The previous 12 months has been marked by a collection of disruptive occasions, a few of which have pushed the area to ranges of rigidity and gravity not often seen earlier than. The battle in Gaza has continued all year long to generate far-reaching regional repercussions. Whereas a brief truce is at present in place, the issue of shifting to the second part of the ceasefire settlement underscores simply how fragile the scenario stays. Tensions peaked in June, when Israel and Iran engaged in a twelve-day confrontation that threatened to pull your entire area right into a wider battle. This sense of vulnerability was additional strengthened by two unprecedented assaults on Qatar – one by Israel and the opposite by Iran – highlighting how even states that had lengthy sought to keep away from direct confrontation have turn out to be more and more uncovered. On the identical time, 2025 marked the return of Donald Trump and america as a central actor within the Center East. From investment-driven agreements with Gulf international locations to renewed efforts at normalisation with Syria, and culminating in strikes on Iranian nuclear services in addition to a number one position within the Gaza peace plan, the 12 months confirmed Washington’s renewed capability to mission energy and affect throughout the area. Trying forward, the brand new 12 months already options a number of key occasions which are prone to form regional dynamics. With elections scheduled in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and, most notably, Israel, alongside main multilateral gatherings similar to COP31 in Antalya, the MENA area is as soon as once more set to be on the centre of worldwide consideration. After such a turbulent 12 months, what may be anticipated from the area in 2026? What would be the essential challenges on the regional degree – and inside particular person international locations?
Consultants from the ISPI community talk about the principle tendencies and issues to look at within the MENA international locations in 2026.
Much less permeable, extra fragile: The Arab MENA in 2026
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“In 2026, the Arab Middle East and North Africa (MENA) may be less permeable than a decade ago – but also more fragile. There may be less Russia in Syria; less Iran in Yemen, Iraq and the Levant; less Türkiye in Iraq and Libya; less Europe in North Africa; and an isolationist United States. Arab authoritarian regimes are consolidating power and fortifying borders. Regional hegemons are recalibrating or turning inward. Global powers have immediate priorities in their own hemispheres. With MENA economic indicators neutral to positive, the arguments for large-scale foreign interventionism may decline. Yet volatility will persist. Social, demographic and climatic pressures keep the region on a tight rope. Israel’s sense of invincibility could pull it deeper into Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Türkiye’s hegemonic aspirations – and domestic business and political calculations – may still fuel activism in the Levant and Libya. Sahel spillovers, migration waves and an Islamic State reawakening could trigger sharper European engagement along North Africa. Sudan is an open wound and a magnet for foreign elements. A less busy Moscow – if the Ukraine war cools – may test a ‘hybrid’ comeback; an imperial, transactional Washington might refocus on the region; while a more confident Beijing expands quietly and opportunistically.”
Youssef Cherif, Director, Columbia World Middle Tunis
Keeping track of oil costs in 2026
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“Among the many indicators to watch in the coming months, the oil price is perhaps the one having the most widespread impact on the entire MENA region. Even if the International Energy Agency (IEA) has recently nuanced its forecast of a global oil supply glut next year, supply still seems likely to exceed demand by 3.84 million barrels per day. This is due to booming supplies from the United States and South American producers, among others, but also to output hikes from the OPEC+. The US Energy Information Administration expects oil prices to further decline next year, with Brent crude falling to an average of $55 per barrel in the first quarter of 2026. In the MENA region, the price glut, while easing the situation for net energy importers, risks durably affecting both high-income and low-income producers. In the first case, a reduction in government revenues and increasing budget deficits could further delay costly diversification projects, like those ongoing in the Gulf. In the second case, which concerns much more vulnerable countries, this could have even more dangerous consequences, demanding robust cuts in public spending and potentially fueling social discontent. An interesting example comes from Algeria. The country’s 2026 budget, while financing a record-high spending plan (135 bn dollars), was based on an average oil price of $60 per barrel. A price fall under this threshold would force the government to adjust its fiscal policies.”
Aldo Liga, ISPI MENA Centre
Cooperation wanted to beat the local weather disaster within the MENA
“As climate stress intensifies across the MENA region, water justice and food sovereignty are set to become central drivers of both conflict and cooperation in 2026. Prolonged droughts, declining groundwater, and disrupted food systems will exacerbate social inequalities, strain state legitimacy, and deepen grievances in already fragile contexts such as Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Yet these pressures may also open spaces for cooperation through shared water governance, climate-adapted agriculture, and regional food systems. Whether climate stress fuels conflict or collaboration will depend on governance choices, inclusion of local communities, and the ability to frame water and food as shared political and social goods rather than securitised resources.”
Sarine Karajerjian, Program Director, Environmental Politics, Arab Reform Initiative
MENA’s area ambitions: Strategic infrastructure amid persistent asymmetries
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“Looking ahead to 2026, MENA space programmes are increasingly converging around a shared strategic logic, despite wide differences in investment scale, institutional maturity and national budgets. Across the region, governments are treating space as critical infrastructure, prioritising earth observation, satellite communications and data-driven services with clear economic, environmental and security value. Capability-building and technological sovereignty are becoming core objectives, closely linked to AI, digital infrastructure and advanced manufacturing agendas. At the same time, countries are positioning themselves across different segments of the space value chain, from downstream analytics to launch and spaceport services. Together, these trends reflect a decisive shift toward more operational, economically grounded and strategically integrated space programmes.”
Michele Scataglini. Affiliate Fellow, Saïd Enterprise College, College of Oxford
2026 for the Gulf: consolidation of financial positive factors and strengthening defence
“The GCC states prioritise two goals for 2026: the consolidation of economic achievements, and the improvement of the regional security scenario. In the Middle East, year 2025 put the GCC states in front of an uncomfortable reality: diplomacy is necessary but no longer enough to deter Iran’s threats (see Tehran’s attack at Al Udeid), and the alliance with the US is no longer sufficient to prevent Israel from using force within their boundaries (see Tel Aviv’s attack in Doha against Hamas). Therefore, year 2026 will be key for Gulf capitals to invest in multi-aligned defence strategies, and in the announced joint defence air shield. Likely, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE will step up pressure on the US to implement the peace plan for Gaza, also working to strengthen their geopolitical return to the Levant, focused on Syria and Iraq. The crises in Sudan and Yemen will need to be addressed given growing intra-Gulf rivalries. In the new year, premises are good for the strengthening of GCC-EU cooperation, and of GCC-Italy strategic partnership with, respectively, the expected second summit, and the upcoming Rome’s joint action plan 2026-2030. Above all, Gulf capitals’ main political effort will aim at balancing, at best, between Washington and Beijing.”
Eleonora Ardemagni, Senior Affiliate Analysis Fellow, ISPI
Iran’s 2026: laborious instances on the horizon
“While the country continues to face the risk of a further Israeli attack, Iran appears to have been pushed down the list of priorities among the United States administration’s various and often competing diplomatic concerns. On the nuclear front, Tehran currently enjoys fewer negotiating levers vis-à-vis Washington and is increasingly struggling to project influence at the regional level, both in the Middle East and in the South Caucasus. Rather than a rupture, continuity should be expected in the near future. The construction of new missile launchers and the strengthening of the missile programme are set to remain the cornerstones of the country’s military doctrine, while the reinforcement of national rhetoric and the revival of pre-Islamic history and myths will continue to serve as a bulwark for the mythomoteur underpinning Iran’s self-narrative. Above all, however, it will be the need to address the country’s recurring domestic challenges that will keep the Pezeshkian government on alert. Worsening economic conditions and a depreciating currency, coupled with a persistent water and environmental crisis, mean that by 2026 Iran will have to contend with as many internal challenges as external ones.”
Luigi Toninelli, ISPI MENA Centre
Israel’s 2026: the street to elections
“In Israel, 2026 will be for sure shaped by the upcoming elections scheduled for October. However, before that deadline, several unresolved issues will need to be addressed. The government and its Prime Minister face a growing credibility gap, reflecting a broader failure to account for key political and institutional responsibilities toward large segments of Israeli society. Externally, Israel’s rejection of Palestinian statehood remains the main obstacle to its regional standing, threating also its relationship with the Trump administration. Amid shaky discussions over the second phase of Gaza peace plan and efforts to expand the Abraham Accords, the creation of a Palestinian state remains as a prerequisite for further normalisation with Israel – a condition Trump cannot afford to sidestep, and therefore neither can Netanyahu. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Netanyahu is set to visit Washington on 29 December. Whether this meeting will once again tilt the pendulum of Trump’s favour back toward Tel Aviv remains uncertain. Trump may ultimately conclude that the best prospects for meaningful progress in the region will emerge only with a new Israeli government taking office. All in all, 2026 is shaping up to be a challenging year – one that is nonetheless likely to prove decisive in determining Israel’s political trajectory and its longer-term future.”
Sara Isabella Leykin, ISPI MENA Centre
Lebanon’s vital 12 months: banking reform, exterior safety and democratic illustration
“2026 will certainly be a decisive year for Lebanon. The overwhelming majority of Lebanese, inside and outside the country, have high hopes for the parliamentary elections expected in the spring. Whatever new government emerges from these elections, three major challenges await it. The first is to complete the reform of the banking system, which would enable depositors to recover their savings confiscated in the wake of the 2019 crisis, and to stabilise the Lebanese pound, thereby improving the living conditions of the majority of Lebanese people. The second is the implementation of a sovereign action plan for external security, which would protect the territory from the capacité de nuisance of its two neighbors, Syria and Israel. The third, most difficult and equally urgent task, is the overhaul, even if only partial, of the sectarian distribution of powers. As things stand, the (Sunni, Shiite and Christian) communities are represented, particularly in Parliament, in a way that benefits the smallest and penalises the largest. The result is that political and economic elites regularly suffer from fragile legitimacy. The 2026 government will therefore also have the challenging but fundamental task of strengthening democratic representation within central institutions.”
Aurélie Daher, Affiliate Professor, Dauphine Université Paris
Syria at a crossroads: unity, energy, and the take a look at of 2026
“Syria’s post-Assad transition has moved at lightning speed in political terms, but it faces great uncertainty on the ground. Ahmed Al-Sharaa spent 2025 consolidating power and restoring Syria’s international standing. The real test comes in 2026, when the country’s future will depend on his ability to keep Syria united amid intense internal and external pressures. The main challenges are fivefold. First, integrating the US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into the state remains unresolved. Failure could trigger tensions with Turkey, which views the SDF as terrorists. Second, Syria must balance competing foreign relationships: deepening ties with Gulf donors vital for reconstruction and maintaining pragmatic cooperation with Russia. Third, internal fragmentation persists along sectarian and ethnic lines, particularly among Alawites and Druze, compounded by ongoing Israeli strikes and stalled security talks with Tel Aviv. Fourth, political inclusion at home remains uncertain: whether the new parliament can act as a real counterweight to presidential power will be decisive. Finally, Al-Sharaa must contain dissent from hardline jihadist factions. How he navigates these challenges in 2026 will shape Syria’s long-term stability.”
Francesco Petronella, Journalist, ISPI
Constraints and prospects for constructing a reputable euro-mediterranean partnership
“The Pact for the Mediterranean seeks to recalibrate the EU’s Mediterranean policy amid growing economic and geopolitical competition. While centred on citizens, economic cooperation, and migration management, it insufficiently addresses critical social sectors such as education and healthcare. Existing trade policies and association agreements prioritise market liberalisation and European competitiveness, reinforcing structural asymmetries between the EU and its southern partners. Financing is a central weakness. Lacking a dedicated budget, the Pact relies on existing instruments within the Multiannual Financial Framework. Coherence between the Pact, the Global Gateway strategy, and the forthcoming Global Europe instrument remains unclear, particularly regarding the balance between public and private funding. The EU’s strategic focus on the West and East, at the expense of the South, further undermines Euro-Mediterranean relations. In 2026, the Pact will face key challenges in implementing its Plan of Action. To deliver tangible impact, it must rest on a genuine inter-Mediterranean partnership based on equality and shared ownership. Building on lessons from the Euro-Moroccan partnership, priorities should include strengthening social protection, energy, transport, and digital connectivity, supporting local industrial value chains, and addressing brain drain. Such an approach is essential to establish a credible, inclusive, and attractive partnership aligned with Mediterranean realities.”
Abdessalam Saad Jaldi, Senior Worldwide Relations Specialist on the Coverage Middle for the New South (PCNS)
Is an answer to the Western Sahara subject getting nearer?
“For the Maghreb, 2026 could prove to be a pivotal year, should a solution finally be found to the long-standing Western Sahara dispute, which for fifty years has divided Morocco and Algeria and hindered the realisation of regional integration. The two leading Maghrebi countries will also have to contend with domestic challenges, including parliamentary elections that will serve as an important test of the state of democracy, voter turnout, and key issues such as the discontent of Moroccan youth, who were at the heart of the unprecedented protests known as ‘Gen Z-212’. However, it is on the external front that the most significant developments may occur. The peace process, which had been at an impasse since 1991, gained fresh momentum with the Resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on 31 October 2025. The mandate of the MINURSO peacekeeping mission was extended for another year, as is customary, but this time the negotiating basis is singular: autonomy (rather than independence, long the objective of the Polisario Front) under Rabat’s sovereignty for the disputed territory. Negotiations among the parties are expected to be intensive and geared towards achieving a concrete outcome. Pressing for a definitive settlement are the United States under Donald Trump, which have also offered to host the talks led by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura.”
Caterina Roggero, ISPI MENA Centre
Libya’s frozen battle: competing authorities sure by shared pursuits
Claudia Gazzini, Senior Analyst, Libya, Worldwide Disaster Group (ICG)
