Meals programs within the Center East and North Africa (MENA) area face numerous structural vulnerabilities and exterior shocks because of the area’s excessive dependence on meals imports, publicity to geopolitical tensions, useful resource shortage, and rising fiscal pressures, which have made meals provide chains more and more fragile. Current bottlenecks attributable to conflicts, commodity value volatility, and logistics and climate-related stresses have underscored the urgency of constructing resilient meals programs. This paper explores the dangers confronting meals provide chains within the MENA area and evaluates pathways to strengthen resilience via the Drivers–Pressures–State–Impression–Response (DPSIR) framework. The paper provides coverage suggestions that emphasise diversified sourcing corridors, resilient logistics and storage networks, enhanced regional cooperation, improved risk-financing mechanisms, climate-adaptive home manufacturing, and stronger meals governance programs.
Attribution: Shruti Jain and Leigh Mante, “Rethinking Resilient Food Systems: Mitigating Food Supply Chain Shocks in the MENA Region,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 532, Observer Analysis Basis, March 2026.
Introduction
Meals safety exists when all folks have steady bodily and financial entry to adequate, protected, and nutritious meals that meets dietary wants and preferences for a wholesome life.[1] It’s outlined by 4 pillars: 1) the bodily availability of meals; 2) financial and bodily entry to meals; 3) meals utilisation; and 4) the steadiness of those parts over a time frame. Reaching meals safety depends on sustaining the integrity of meals programs—the interconnected parts and actions concerned within the manufacturing, processing, distribution, and preparation of meals.[2] As these programs are more and more weak to disruptions, the idea of meals system resilience—the capability to supply adequate, applicable, and accessible meals over time and throughout ranges within the face of shocks—turns into crucial. [3]
Within the Center East and North Africa (MENA), meals system resilience is beneath fixed stress. The area is residence to roughly 519 million folks and is projected to develop at an annual price of 1.7 %, with populations more and more shifting from rural to city areas.[4],[5],[6] The area has lengthy suffered from meals insecurity because of restricted arable land and water assets, geopolitical tensions and battle, financial instability, structural poverty, and intensifying local weather shocks. Collectively, these components improve reliance on meals imports and expose the area to disruptions in commerce corridors, constraining entry to protected, reasonably priced, and nutritious meals. Meals provide chain shocks confer with exterior disruptions that prohibit meals availability, entry, and vitamin, both briefly or over extended intervals.[7]
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Variations in financial improvement and political stability throughout MENA international locations form their present capacities to soak up and adapt to shocks within the meals provide chain. Given the rise and extended length of regional conflicts, mixed with aggravated droughts and water shortage, strategising the way to preserve meals system resilience amidst exterior shocks is essential.
Desk 1: MENA International locations: Overview
Nation
Inhabitants, Whole (2024)
Revenue-Stage and Fragility (World Financial institution)
Oil-Importer/Oil-Exporter Standing
World Meals Safety Index 2022 Rating out of 113
Employment in Agriculture (% of Whole Employment)
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (Worth Added to GDP)
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Algeria
46,814,308
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Exporter
68
9% (2023)
13.1 % (2023)
Bahrain
1,588,670
Excessive-Revenue
Oil Exporter
38
1% (2023)
0.3% (2023)
Djibouti
1,168,722
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Importer
–
1% (2023)
2.6% (2024)
Egypt
116,538,258
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Importer
77
19% (2023)
13.7% (2024)
Iran
91,567,738
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Exporter
–
14% (2023)
13% (2024)
Iraq
46,042,015
Center-Revenue with Battle
Creating Oil Exporter
–
8% (2023)
3.4% (2024)
Israel
9,974,400
Excessive-Revenue
–
24
1% (2023)
1.3% (2024)
Jordan
11,552,876
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Importer
47
3% (2023)
5.1% (2024)
Kuwait
4,973,861
Excessive-Revenue
Oil Exporter
50
2% (2023)
0.5% (2024)
Lebanon
5,805,962
Center-Revenue with Battle
Memorandum
–
3% (2023)
1.0% (2023)
Libya
7,381,023
Center-Revenue with Battle
Memorandum
–
9% (2023)
1.7% (2024)
Malta
574,346
Excessive-Revenue
–
–
1% (2023)
0.2% (2023)
Morocco
38,081,173
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Importer
57
30% (2023)
10.1% (2024)
Oman
5,281,538
Excessive-Revenue
Oil Exporter
35
6% (2023)
2.6% (2024)
Qatar
2,857,822
Excessive-Revenue
Oil Exporter
30
2% (2023)
0.3% (2024)
Saudi Arabia
35,300,280
Excessive-Revenue
Oil Exporter
41
3% (2023)
2.5% (2024)
Syria
24,672,760
Low-Revenue with Battle
Memorandum
113
15% (2023)
43.1% (2022)
Tunisia
12,277,109
Center-Revenue
Creating Oil Importer
62
13% (2023)
9.3% (2023)
United Arab Emirates
10,876,981
Excessive-Revenue
Oil Exporter
23
1% (2023)
0.7% (2023)
The West Financial institution and Gaza
5,289,152
Center-Revenue with Battle
Creating Oil Importer
–
6% (2022)
5.7% (2022)
Yemen
40,583,164
Low-Revenue with Battle
Memorandum
111
29% (2023)
28..7% (2018)
Supply: Authors’ personal, utilizing information from the World Financial institution[8],[9],[10] and Economist Impression[11]
Methodology
The geographical scope of the MENA area on this paper consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the West Financial institution and Gaza, and Yemen. The area is analysed utilizing the World Financial institution’s cross-sectional classifications of earnings, hydrocarbon standing, and battle; (1) higher-income international locations, together with Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman; (2) middle-income international locations, together with growing oil-exporting Algeria and Iran and oil-importing Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Djibouti; (3) middle-income, conflict-affected international locations, together with oil-exporting Libya and Iraq and oil-importing Lebanon and the West Financial institution and Gaza; and (4) low-income, conflict-affected international locations, together with Syria and Yemen (see Desk 1).
The paper utilises the DPSIR framework (Driving Forces–Pressures–State–Impression–Responses) to judge components influencing MENA’s meals provide chain shocks and responses. This framework hyperlinks environmental stressors to market-led shocks, which have an effect on meals provide chain stability within the area. Driving forces embrace structural atmosphere that render MENA’s meals programs weak, similar to demographic developments, agro-climatic situations, the food-energy-water nexus, and political financial system dynamics. Pressures that influence affordability, entry, and availability come up from exterior occasions similar to geopolitical conflicts and pandemics.
The paper utilises the World Financial institution’s Logistics Efficiency Index variables to measure commerce and logistics pressures, similar to transport disruptions, and chokepoints, various throughout MENA international locations. The ‘state’ measures the current situations following the environmental stressors, together with financial and monetary challenges affecting meals inflation and storage losses. ‘Impact’ consists of financial macro-implications, similar to rising power consumption for entry to potable water, dietary developments, excessive import payments, longer transport durations, and meals wastage. ‘Responses’ measures the present mechanisms that cut back pressures and mitigate impacts—this consists of meals and water import diversification, logistics capability constructing, value stabilisation, and useful resource optimisation. Primarily based on these findings, the paper suggests coverage suggestions tailor-made to MENA international locations.
Determine 1: DPSIR Framework
Supply: Authors’ personal
Determine 2: DPSIR Methodology
Supply: Authors’ personal
Structural Vulnerabilities and Contextual Realities Shaping MENA Meals Techniques
Water Shortage
The MENA area faces acute water shortage, pushed by local weather change and its restricted share—round 1 %—of worldwide freshwater assets.[12] Rising demand from agriculture, industrialisation, power manufacturing, and urbanisation is putting growing stress on water provides, with consumption in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) international locations exceeding 500 litres per particular person per day.[13] A number of the most water-stressed international locations embrace Kuwait, Cyprus, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.[14] By 2050, it’s estimated that two-thirds of MENA international locations could have lower than 200 cubic meters of renewable water assets per capita per yr, in comparison with 7,000 cubic meters in different areas.[15]
Determine 3: Water Stress Rankings
Supply: Aqueduct Nation Rankings[16]
Water shortage within the MENA area is undermining meals programs. As roughly 70 % of agriculture is rain-fed, water shortage results in an general decline in agricultural manufacturing and adjustments in crop varieties.[17] Saudi Arabia is projected to have the most important losses in agricultural productiveness, with a couple of 65 % discount from present ranges by 2050.[18] In the identical interval, the Republic of Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic are projected to lose 35 % and 13 % of their agricultural manufacturing. Equally, Iran and Lebanon will lose about 5 % of their manufacturing. Water shortage may also influence the crop baskets, with the alternative of staples with much less water-intensive crops. As an illustration, the federal government of Egypt has lowered the authorized rice cultivation space because of water shortages and Saudi Arabia plans to part out wheat and corn manufacturing to safe water availability.[19] Water shortage’s influence on the agricultural sector has additionally prolonged to the livelihoods of the producers, particularly smallholder farmers. It has been noticed to probably set off migration within the MENA area to city centres.[20]
Many MENA international locations presently depend on desalinated water for quick consumption. Saudi Arabia holds among the world’s largest desalination vegetation, together with the Al Jubail facility, which produces over 1.4 million cubic meters of water day by day. The Saline Water Conversion Company produces about 20 % of the world’s desalinated water.[21] Elevated adoption of desalination, nevertheless, has drawbacks; foremost is the rise in salinity ranges within the Gulf and Pink Sea, which has a detrimental influence on the marine biodiversity, species persistence, fisheries, and coastal communities. Furthermore, desalination results in heightened use of power—Saudi Arabia alone consumes about 300,000 barrels of oil per day to energy the vegetation.[22] Moreover, the big, mounted nature of desalination amenities and their integration into industrial and home programs heightens their vulnerability to kinetic assaults, as demonstrated within the Israel-US-Iran battle.[a],[23] Due to this fact, the area should take a look at long-term sustainable options to deal with rising water shortage considerations.
Determine 4: Agricultural Manufacturing Losses by 2050
Supply: World Financial institution, 2023[24]
The Pure Useful resource Curse
Sure North African international locations are endowed with fertile land and free-flowing water assets, but this has bolstered the ‘resource curse’, growing the danger of battle over useful resource governance, inhibiting progress in direction of resilient meals programs, and heightening water insecurity.[25] Transboundary administration and management of the area’s scarce water assets have traditionally represented a centre of geopolitical competitors. The Nile River, which flows via Ethiopia and Egypt, exemplifies these tensions, with competing nationwide calls for. Regardless of dialogue coordination efforts led by the African Union, the European Union, and the US, the international locations failed to shut a binding settlement. Ethiopia prefers a versatile and sovereign strategy to dam administration, whereas Egypt prefers mounted authorized ensures.[26] Amidst the diplomatic gridlock, Ethiopia inaugurated its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2025, which it pursued unilaterally to safe a home and exportable energy supply, help home agriculture, and improve regional affect. Nevertheless, the dam poses dangers to downstream water entry in Egypt and Sudan. Egypt’s agriculture sector consumes 79 % of Egypt’s freshwater withdrawals. Given projected inhabitants will increase in Egypt coupled with growing drought, home water shortages are anticipated to accentuate.[27]
Regardless of entry to land and water assets for agriculture, these international locations have fallen brief in growing holistic meals programs because of a manifestation of the useful resource curse mixed with exterior affect. Donors and the worldwide group have inspired insurance policies that favour monocropping methods for money crop exports, which have depleted water in addition to land grabbing, the place land is transferred from smallholder farmers to international buyers and enterprises.[28],[29] These methods have traditionally dominated the MENA area’s meals safety agenda, as seen in Morocco and Tunisia. Land monopolisation for the industrial manufacturing of hybrid non-local varieties has exhausted soil and depleted water availability in Morocco. Likewise, the inflow of agricultural investments within the Tunisian village of “El-Ititez 1” for jojoba manufacturing and export has depleted land and water.[30]
Pressures: Headwinds for Meals Safety and Meals System Resilience
Geopolitical Impacts and Tensions
The rise in world shocks, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions just like the Russia-Ukraine conflict and US-Israel-Iran battle, has threatened meals worth chain stability and negatively impacted family capability to manage, resulting in compromised dietary outcomes. MENA international locations exhibit various levels of vulnerability to meals provide chain shocks, relying on political-economic instability, hydrocarbon dependency, and meals import percentages.
COVID-19 Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic destabilised meals worth chains on each the provision and demand sides and elevated meals costs. Though international locations skilled comparable impacts, similar to labour and uncooked materials shortages, the severity of impacts is distinguishable between high- and middle- to lower-income international locations.[31] Throughout the pandemic, high-income international locations skilled supply-driven impacts similar to logistical bottlenecks and provide chain disruptions, whereas lower-income international locations noticed demand-driven impacts on account of a lack of earnings and elevated linkages to poverty, which lowered their buying energy and altered their capability to make nutritious meals consumption selections.[32]
Within the MENA area, the start of the pandemic affected meals availability lower than in the course of the 2008 financial disaster. Conversely, meals safety dimensions of accessibility and utilisation shifted to a a lot bigger extent. Meals accessibility was restricted by adjustments in meals transport prices, meals help distribution mechanisms, and meals shortages in supermarkets and compounded by financial uncertainty, abrupt job losses, and meals value hikes.[33] This relationship was extra pronounced in lower-income international locations, which skilled larger income-responsiveness because of rising poverty and lowered earnings ranges, contributing to a contraction in meals consumption demand.[34] For instance, the pandemic contributed to over 10 million full-time job losses within the MENA area, influencing family capability to adapt to adjustments in meals costs.[35]
Russia’s Battle in Ukraine and US-Israel Battle with Iran
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has resulted in rising power costs additional exacerbating fertiliser prices, since pure gasoline is crucial for its manufacturing.[38] Likewise, delays in Liquefied Pure Fuel (LNG) manufacturing and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz because the US and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February instantly raised Center East urea costs.[39] Moreover, international locations deploying fashionable applied sciences to optimise agricultural operations are additionally experiencing elevated prices due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict since applied sciences depend on steady power assets.[40] Within the short-term, greater oil costs and gas shortages have raised manufacturing prices, contributing to elevated meals costs.[41]
MENA’s reliance on Ukraine for practically one-third of its cereal imports heightened vulnerability to produce disruptions.[42] Nevertheless, meals availability vulnerabilities various in response to the political and financial context of every nation. Center-income international locations like Algeria and Jordan skilled average vulnerability because of decrease export dependence ranges. They responded to the shock by diversifying commerce partnerships to take care of the commerce circulate of staple cereal merchandise.[43] Creating oil-importing international locations like Egypt and Tunisia had been reasonably weak because of excessive import dependence charges compounded by rising populations in Egypt and inner political conflicts in Tunisia. They overcame meals availability pressures by increasing meals storage capacities and wheat manufacturing infrastructure or securing meals assist from Gulf states.[44] Decrease- to middle-income international locations with battle, like Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen, had been extremely weak to the disaster because of multiplied results from inner political-economic instability and meals assist reliance which was entangled in delayed shipments.[45]
Conflicts inside MENA can harm infrastructure, impose roadblocks or sanctions, and disrupt the motion of products, weakening meals provide chains. For instance, the closure of key maritime chokepoints in the course of the Israel-US-Iran battle compromised agricultural offers, leaving exports headed to MENA stranded at port because of heightened freight prices.[46] Meals additionally turns into much less accessible in battle zones. Growing political instability can result in neglect of the agriculture sector, leading to a scarcity of help for farmers searching for agricultural help, credit score, or insurance coverage.[47]
Present Situation of the MENA Economies
Financial and Monetary Challenges
As MENA international locations are excessive meals importers, geopolitical pressures and exterior shocks to meals worth chains can influence home meals costs. Home meals costs within the area are additionally weak to foreign money depreciation, particularly for conflict-prone areas similar to Yemen and Lebanon, as a weaker native foreign money will increase retail meals costs and reduces disposable incomes. As an illustration, because of ongoing conflicts and local weather results in Lebanon, the typical meals inflation in 2025 remained as excessive as 23.9 %.[48]
Crude oil and agricultural commodity costs are carefully correlated, as oil is a key enter in agricultural processing and transportation.[49] Greater oil costs spill over to greater costs for transport and fertiliser, which ends up in a rise in retail meals costs. Volatility in oil costs can immediately have an effect on the international locations’ trade charges, fiscal capability, and subsidies. Thus, with lowering oil costs for oil exporters similar to Algeria or Iraq, foreign money weak spot and spikes in meals inflation had been noticed.[50] Moreover, a correlation between biofuel and crude oil costs was established, wherein biofuel turned extra aggressive as crude oil costs elevated—resulting in greater meals costs, notably for sugar, maize, and vegetable oils.[51] To fight excessive inflation, a number of MENA international locations have resorted to excessive meals subsidies, which influence fiscal prices in the long run.[52] International locations such because the UAE, Algeria, and Egypt adopted new value ceilings and loosened import restrictions, which eased home inflation however got here at a value of declining authorities income.[53]
Desk 2: Meals Inflation in Choose MENA International locations 2025
Nation
Meals Inflation 2025 (Yr on Yr %)
Lebanon
23.9
Egypt
6.9
Tunisia
5.7
Morocco
0.4
Jordan
0.8
Saudi Arabia
1.5
UAE
0.4
Supply: Buying and selling Economics[54]
Funding in agriculture and meals worth chains is essential to make sure meals system resilience. It creates multiplier results for allied sectors and enhances meals manufacturing effectivity. Sector investments enhance meals provide chains, selling regional and worldwide connectivity.[55] In most MENA international locations, nevertheless, meals safety is threatened by inadequate private and non-private funding in agriculture. For North African international locations, the typical share of agriculture in authorities expenditure is above the worldwide common; nevertheless, this quantity is comparatively small when contemplating the share of agriculture within the area’s Gross Home Product (GDP). The Meals and Agriculture Group’s Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI)[b] signifies that, aside from Kuwait, all MENA international locations display decrease agriculture expenditure than their GDP weight. On common, the AOI for North African international locations stays low, whereas the index stays highest in three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[c] international locations—Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain.[56] Lebanon, Algeria, and Egypt have among the lowest AOI within the area.
Along with funding in agriculture and agricultural worth chains, fast local weather change in MENA requires scaling up adaptation finance for the adoption of climate-smart agriculture (CSA). Within the area, the primary supply of funding is public, within the type of grants and funds. The fund, nevertheless, has been primarily focused at mitigation slightly than adaptation, which is required for the adoption of CSA.[57] Whereas a big share of farmland was beneath small-scale administration, solely about 1.5 % of local weather finance was acquired for small-scale agri-food programs within the area.
Desk 3: AOI Index for MENA International locations
Nation
AOI Index (2019-21)
Algeria
0.20
Bahrain
0.58
Egypt
0.11
Iran
NA
Iraq
NA
Jordan
0.13
Kuwait
1.18
Lebanon
0.08
Libya
NA
Mauritania
0.25
Morocco
0.30
Oman
0.25
Qatar
NA
Saudi Arabia
0.31
Sudan
NA
Syrian Arab Republic
0.23
Tunisia
0.35
United Arab Emirates
0.61
Yemen
NA
Somalia
NA
Supply: FAO[58]
Impression of the Drivers and Pressures on Meals Resilience in MENA
Import Dependence
Local weather change-driven impacts on decrease agricultural manufacturing within the MENA area accounted for an increase in meals costs. As meals demand stays inelastic, a rise in meals costs is not going to decrease its demand. So as to match the discount in provide and fulfil its home consumption, the MENA area is more and more turning to imports.[d],[59] In 2024, the GCC international locations imported US$60 billion value of agri-food and seafood, with an annual development price of 6.7 %. Among the many exporters, India was the most important provider with 12.6 % of exports, adopted by Brazil with 11 %, the US with 5.7 %, and the Netherlands with 7.8 % export share.[60]
There’s a rising hole between agricultural provide and demand within the area. The area already has one of many highest cereal dependencies on this planet, which is coupled with rising meals subsidies and lowering availability of land and water. Determine 5 exhibits the share of kilocalories consumed which can be sourced from imports. A lower in agricultural manufacturing within the area may result in a lack of about US$50 billion in internet agricultural exports by 2050.[61] Rising import dependence may additionally expose the area to cost volatility, as MENA international locations can be inclined to geopolitical and world local weather shocks.
Determine 5: Share of Kilocalories Equipped by Imports in MENA International locations
Supply: INRAE, CIRAD[62]
Consumption Traits and Dietary Paradox
Urbanisation, geopolitical dangers, and earnings development have reshaped consumption patterns within the MENA area.[63] City households with greater disposable incomes eat extra processed meals, fat, sugar, fruits, greens, dairy merchandise, and animal-sourced proteins; in rural households, diets nonetheless embrace staples similar to maize, rice, millet, and cassava.[64] This suggests that the dietary consumption patterns of rural households are extra susceptible to getting impacted by rising environmental stressors, leaving them with restricted options for his or her dietary consumption. Moreover, with larger dependence on processed meals via imports, diets have turn into much less micronutrient-rich and extra calorie-dense, particularly amongst youngsters and adolescents.[65]
The MENA area additionally faces a double burden of malnutrition, pushed by unequal entry to nutritious meals: undernutrition persists in rural communities and North African international locations, whereas weight problems is extra prevalent amongst middle- and upper-income teams in city centres and Gulf international locations.[66] In line with the FAO, round 52 million people within the area face power undernutrition, whereas 58 % of adults are overweight.[67] The MENA area additionally shows extremes within the meals safety spectrum—whereas the UAE and Israel carry out properly with scores above 74 within the Meals Safety Index 2022, Syria and Yemen are the worst-performing international locations globally with scores of 36.3 and 40.1.[68]
Analysis of Current Response Mechanisms
1. Provide-Pushed Responses from Oil-Exporting International locations
Given excessive meals import dependencies, a number of GCC international locations have outsourced their meals manufacturing via land acquisitions and diversified commerce partnerships. Gulf international locations such because the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait have acquired over half 1,000,000 hectares in a number of African economies similar to Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia.[69] Desk 4 signifies the present measurement beneath contract for crops in a number of GCC international locations, with UAE and Saudi Arabia rising as main buyers in African land offers. Explorations to develop the UAE’s footprint in farm offers are additionally ongoing in Latin America—UAE-based buyers are exploring land offers in Mexico and Colombia.[70]
Desk 4: Land Offers for Crops in Africa by GCC International locations (in Ha)
Nation
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
Egypt, Arab Rep.
119331
42000
Nil
Nil
Ethiopia
11000
322286
Nil
Nil
Namibia
220
Nil
Nil
Nil
Sierra Leone
23500
Nil
Nil
Nil
Sudan
65400
21271
203081
189777
Morocco
561
1200
Nil
Nil
Congo, Rep.
19000
Nil
Nil
Nil
Kenya
Nil
40468
40000
Nil
Mauritania
Nil
Nil
3200
3200
Algeria
Nil
Nil
1811
Nil
Supply: Land Matrix[71]
The UAE is more and more leveraging its developed transport logistics (via sea, air, and street) to strengthen its meals provide chains—it initiated the development of a brand new US$150-million undertaking to develop the Jebel Ali port in 2024.[72] This has given rise to triangular partnerships between the GCC international locations, South Asia, and Africa for making certain meals safety, whereby the GCC international locations complement Africa’s land and labour with capital and logistics.
Regardless of the rising pattern of outsourcing meals manufacturing, analysis signifies that this strategy can have adversarial results on meals safety, particularly within the rural areas.[73] In a number of circumstances the place land acquisitions happen with out satisfactory consideration or compensation to native communities, it has typically contributed adversely to the social cloth and the atmosphere. Equally, in a number of African nations, whereas land acquisitions led to a rise in non-local staple crop manufacturing, they decreased the dietary range in native communities.[74] In lots of circumstances, land acquisitions don’t take Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) indicators into consideration, exacerbating present sustainability-related considerations for native communities. Thus, whereas outsourcing meals manufacturing can allow a number of international locations to entry and guarantee meals provide chains, they should be supported with transparency and adherence to moral requirements. Buying nations should guarantee sturdy governance and nullify the destructive impacts confronted by native communities. This may be achieved by making certain that native communities are well-compensated and supplied different livelihoods in addition to higher use of ESG metrics.
Additional, different means to outsource meals manufacturing and processing embrace investing in meals parks and meals corridors, in addition to strengthening commerce agreements. The UAE and India have agreed to arrange a meals hall and several other meals parks to centralise manufacturing and course of transport to the UAE.[75] UAE-based firms are additionally investing closely in Asian and African international locations to construct food-security infrastructure within the type of chilly storage, terminals, and logistics hubs. Equally, within the I2U2 framework (India-Israel-UAE-US), leaders’ assertion dedicated to investing about US$2 billion to assemble in India and supply climate-smart applied sciences to scale back meals wastage and improve yields.[76]
The Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Funding Firm (SALIC), a subsidiary of its sovereign wealth fund (Public Funding Fund), is investing in agribusinesses throughout international locations to help sustainable meals provide programs. It’s buying property in areas similar to South America and Australia to extend entry to important imports similar to livestock.[77] Moreover, the nation is investing as much as US$700 million to develop particular financial zones and infrastructure in Africa for a number of sectors, together with agricultural items.[78]
The MENA international locations have additionally signed a number of commerce agreements which allow commerce diversification, reduce tariffs, and enhance commerce that might ease large-scale meals imports. As an illustration, the European Free Commerce Settlement between European international locations and GCC states offers preferential buying and selling situations for the import of agricultural merchandise.[79] The UAE’s Complete Financial Partnership Agreements (CEPA) with international locations similar to India, Indonesia, Türkiye, Cambodia, and Jordan covers tariff discount, notably for imports of staples, processed meals, rice, sugar, and meat.[80] Equally, the US has FTAs with a number of MENA international locations, similar to Bahrain, Jordan, Oman and Morocco, for enhanced agri-food entry.[81] Moreover, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and the North Africa area have ongoing commerce agreements with the EU for improved entry to agricultural items, notably for cereals.[82]
As a long-term technique for making certain resilient meals provide chains, investing in meals parks and devoted corridors is extra steady, because it addresses the ‘missing middle’ in provide chains. Funding in infrastructure improvement can also be characterised by decrease dangers than outsourcing manufacturing via the acquisition of farmlands, as abroad farmland management is commonly paired with battle and moral constraints. As well as, commerce agreements observe a rules-based system with higher transparency and shock-proof mechanism.
2. Demand-Pushed Responses to Meals Provide Chain Shocks by Oil-Importing International locations
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a 2022 examine by El-Shal et al. on social security nets and meals safety in the course of the pandemic highlights how weak households responded to shocks by smoothing consumption or earnings.[83] Declines in earnings, rising unemployment, and growing poverty altered meals consumption patterns. When smoothing consumption, households lowered or shifted spending, typically promoting property or substituting in direction of cheaper staples on the expense of extra nutritious meals similar to vegatables and fruits.[84] Conversely, when smoothing earnings, households responded by counting on precautionary financial savings or social security nets like money switch programmes.[85] Throughout the pandemic and in different circumstances, emergency money transfers within the area resulted in improved short-term meals safety, however results fade within the medium to long run with out complementary interventions. For instance, Lebanon’s humanitarian money help programme improved dietary consumption in the course of the programme, however this influence was weakened post-completion.[86]
In response to shocks from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, oil-exporting international locations similar to Algeria, Libya, and GCC states had been capable of leverage extra hydrocarbon revenues from the rise in gas costs to mitigate the meals disaster.[87] International locations with out oil-export revenues have mitigated conflict impacts by changing meals subsidies with social security programmes. Center-income international locations like Egypt and Algeria instituted such programmes concentrating on the poor. Within the absence of subsidies, meals assist from worldwide organisations or neighbouring GCC international locations supplied a short-term answer, particularly for lower-income international locations in battle like Syria, Lebanon, and Libya.[88] Nevertheless, declining humanitarian funding underscores the boundaries of counting on exterior help over the long run.[89]
Total, the MENA area has relied on subsidies to stabilise costs and buffer in opposition to financial shocks. Nevertheless, subsidies are more and more more difficult to maintain because of shrinking fiscal areas and hovering debt ranges.[90] For instance, many MENA international locations subsidise agricultural inputs similar to seeds and fertilisers, which account for a big share of public spending and additional drive debt in international locations like Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia.[91] Untargeted subsidies largely profit higher-income farmers and households, perpetuating inequality. As an illustration, though meals subsidy concentrating on in Egypt has improved, greater than half of the households within the wealthiest 20 % reap the advantages. Likewise, in Tunisia, the wealthiest households obtain 3 times the per capita quantity acquired by the poorest from meals and power subsidies.[92] Whereas worldwide lending establishments such because the Worldwide Financial Fund (IMF) have positioned stress on power subsidy reform, subsidies on meals staples have hardly shifted because of worry of social unrest and gaps in governance that inhibit the potential for reform.[93] This creates inefficiencies, since subsidies trigger market distortions, the place decrease meals costs result in greater demand, overconsumption, and misguided manufacturing will increase.
Traditionally, MENA international locations have leveraged participation within the digital water market[e] to complement home meals manufacturing and strengthen meals safety.[94] Water-scarce international locations import water-intensive agricultural merchandise to scale back inner useful resource burdens and meet native meals calls for. Nevertheless, this technique’s effectiveness and sustainability is decided by import diversification ranges, inner alignment between home agricultural and worldwide commerce insurance policies, and satisfactory valuation of tradeoffs between home manufacturing and imports.
Egypt’s technique, as an example, has advanced in direction of fostering imports of high-demand wheat, maize, and soybeans from Japanese Europe, South America, and the US supplemented by a self-sufficiency coverage to supply 50 % of wheat internally.[95] This twin diversification and home manufacturing technique ought to theoretically guarantee a level of safety from unstable worldwide markets. Nevertheless, Egypt’s heavy dependence on Russia and Ukraine for wheat examined its technique’s resiliency, prompting additional provide diversification and refocusing imports in direction of commodities with much less publicity to shocks. In distinction, Morocco was traditionally a net-importer of digital water within the type of cereal from Europe and Latin America. Nevertheless, current years have seen lowered digital water imports because of an export-oriented agricultural coverage favouring financial achieve from the manufacturing of high-value vegatables and fruits. The manufacturing of those crops is reliant on water-intensive irrigation strategies and should thus be unsustainable in the long term because the nation relies on more and more precarious rainfall.[96]
Determine 6: Analysis of Trinity of Response Mechanisms
Supply: Authors’ personal
Desk 5: Present Responses to Meals Provide Chain Shocks
Response Kind
Response
Sustainability
Effectivity
Fairness
Demand-Pushed
Focused Money Transfers[97]
Unsustainable within the long-term with out sustainable livelihood pathways
Environment friendly for non permanent shocks as a result of it improves consumption, entry, and meals safety briefly (e.g., Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan)
Requires satisfactory concentrating on to stop destructive spillovers like tensions between weak teams excluded from the money switch
Meals Subsidies[98]
Unsustainable within the long-term, however difficult to reform within the short-term
Inefficient as a result of it will increase fiscal burden and diverts assets away from different public companies, and causes financial distortions
Regardless of enchancment, meals subsidies have a tendency to learn middle- and high-income teams (e.g., in Egypt and Tunisia)
Humanitarian Meals Help[99]
Unsustainable within the long-term; requires complementary initiatives to realize resilience
Environment friendly for non permanent shocks as a result of it maintains meals entry
Broken infrastructure, insecurity, and gas shortages impede equitable meals distribution and entry
Digital Water Imports
Sustainable within the long-term when paired with water price valuation, climate-resilient meals manufacturing, and diversification of import sources
Environment friendly for regulating home water and energy-use
Potential inequity in water-exporting international locations if commerce is just not aligned with the true price of water
Provide-Pushed
Outsourcing
Unsustainable in the long run because of prices related to moral and ESG constraints
Environment friendly for constructing provide chains with custom-made consumption necessities
Inequitable because of destructive influence on native communities
Meals Park and Land Acquisitions
Sustainable within the long-term because of filling the ‘missing middle’ hole in infrastructure improvement
Environment friendly for constructing alternate routes and shock-resilient provide chains
Equitable with mutual regional advantages
Commerce Diversification
Sustainable because of rules-based agreements for diversified commerce companions
Environment friendly for making certain alternate commerce companions
Equitable with mutual advantages for commerce companions
Supply: Authors’ personal
Coverage Suggestions
This evaluation exhibits that political stability and financial capability outline shock influence depth and coping capability.[100] Pursuing self-sufficiency is just not possible for many MENA international locations given the range in meals calls for, land, and water constraints. Thus, mitigating meals provide chain shocks to maintain resilient meals programs and safeguard meals safety requires multi-pronged options that maintain meals provide and make sure that customers retain bodily and monetary entry to meals. The next suggestions are tailor-made to the political and monetary capability of MENA international locations, incorporating provide and demand-driven methods.
1. Reallocate capital, water, land, and technological assets.
Excessive-Revenue Economies
Excessive-income, oil-exporting international locations with sturdy sovereign wealth funds and financial diversification imperatives such because the GCC ought to strategically distribute financing between infrastructure, coaching, and analysis and improvement for sustainable meals programs.[f] This cluster has the monetary capability and political will to catalyse innovation for meals safety and meals system modernisation.[101] Agriculture includes lower than 3 % of GDP for every nation, so reaching self-sufficient manufacturing is extremely unrealistic given local weather restraints and the range of client demand (see Desk 1).
Regardless of plentiful capital, investments are closely skewed in direction of agri-technologies similar to vertical and indoor farming, which primarily produce high-value crops like leafy greens and don’t meet broader meals basket wants or dietary requirements.[102] Furthermore, many fashionable agri-technologies are imported from temperate areas and are energy-intensive, requiring extra optimisation to fulfill native warmth and humidity situations.[103]
Agri-tech investments must be directed in direction of fostering analysis and improvement and optimising locally-rooted manufacturing of drought-tolerant crop varieties, open-field farming, and internet homes, and enhancing meals storage and lowering meals loss and waste. Persevering with to interact in digital water buying and selling will assist complement forthcoming commerce partnerships and cut back home dependency on water-intensive meals manufacturing.[104] Exploring the feasibility of cleaner gas options like photo voltaic for desalination would additionally assist cut back further power burdens.
Center-Revenue Economies
Center-income, oil-exporting international locations like Algeria and Iran can leverage extra state expenditures from oil-revenue spikes to soak up shocks to meals provide chains. Center-income, oil-importers like Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, the place the agricultural share of GDP wavers between 9 and 14 %, should stability the growth of agricultural manufacturing with financial and useful resource depletion implications. International locations like Egypt and Morocco have expanded agricultural operations for financial improvement functions, but they have to stability high-value crops for export versus fostering native subsistence farming and cover-cropping for home consumption.[105],[106]
Moreover, incorporating water-energy-food issues (WEF) in coverage planning is essential to make sure power and agriculture don’t compete for restricted water assets. Overcoming water shortage limitations requires an built-in water administration strategy targeted on demand-side administration via agricultural subsidy reform, alignment of siloed insurance policies, and diversification of virtual-import sources in direction of reasonably priced and steady meals suppliers. Redesigning agricultural subsidies to mirror the true worth and prices of water use would incentivise environment friendly farming practices and smarter water useful resource allocation.
Aligning agriculture, commerce, and social security internet insurance policies would allow a versatile authorities response, stopping an over- or under-reaction throughout meals provide chain shocks. Since meals import diversification capability may be constrained by the focus of worldwide suppliers, these international locations must also spend money on climate-resilient agricultural practices. As an illustration, enhancing efforts to enhance soil fertility and administration would assist bridge this hole.[107] Though Jordan is residence to a modernising meals manufacturing system, the dietary outcomes of refugee teams have to be thought-about in meals system planning.[108] Given Djibouti’s minimal agricultural manufacturing and excessive meals insecurity from undernourishment and rising weight problems, the nation should leverage its profitable ventures to develop social security nets and wean off meals assist dependency.[109]
Center-Revenue, Battle-Affected Economies
Center-income, conflict-affected, oil-importing international locations like Libya and Iraq should optimise useful resource distribution, enhance agricultural sector productiveness, and develop focused social security internet insurance policies. For each international locations, agriculture composes lower than 5 % of GDP. In Libya, meals insecurity stems from a scarcity of financial entry slightly than availability. Within the short-term, meals safety will probably be greatest addressed via humanitarian help, however investments in drought-resistant applied sciences for manufacturing within the drylands will assist enhance long-term meals safety.
In Iraq, the potential for growing wheat yield is excessive. Because the nation recovers from battle, directing investments in direction of climate-smart agriculture to enhance yields will assist shut the wheat import and manufacturing hole. Creating focused social insurance policies would additionally enhance meals entry.[110] Lebanon can also be recovering from battle and contending with an inflow of refugees affected by malnutrition. Whereas current authorities funding in direction of agriculture is low, present assets may be reallocated away from crops produced past the native full self-sufficiency stage to be exported into low-self-sufficiency, high-nutrition, low-resource-intensive crops which would cut back reliance on international imports.[111] The continued battle within the West Financial institution and Gaza necessitates quick coverage consideration in direction of enabling bodily entry to meals assist and vouchers.
Low-Revenue, Battle-Affected Economies
With declining international assist and lowered efforts from regional establishments, conflict-affected, low-income international locations like Syria and Yemen can flip to European partnerships to fill the funding hole for emergency meals assist within the short-term. Nevertheless, this dangers creating a brand new system of dependency. Thus, leveraging the capability of native and regional actors to ship meals donations and wean off donor-driven humanitarian help within the long-term is essential. Partnering with the personal sector to develop infrastructure that hyperlinks displaced communities to financing mechanisms that may grant them entry to meals additionally presents a viable possibility.[112] Shifting reliance on meals assist dependency via insurance policies that strengthen financial livelihoods within the agriculture sector would additionally assist improve meals entry within the long-term.[113]
2. Put money into high quality infrastructure and cut back commerce bottlenecks.
Excessive-Revenue Economies
For prime-income MENA economies such because the GCC international locations, most carry out comparatively properly when it comes to commerce logistics. In line with the World Financial institution’s Logistics Efficiency Index (LPI) 2023, the UAE tops the MENA record with a rating of 4.0 out of 5.0, adopted by Israel (3.6), Bahrain (3.5), Qatar (3.5), and Saudi Arabia (3.0).[114] Aside from the UAE, the remainder of the high-income international locations’ scores vary from 3.6 to three.5, above the worldwide common of three.0. Nevertheless, regardless of the above-average world benchmark, the area faces obstacles because of chokepoints in commerce routes. Freight volatility is widespread for commerce routes connecting MENA international locations, and essential bottlenecks embrace the Pink Sea and the Strait of Hormuz.
For the GCC international locations, their strategic geographical location may be leveraged to entry different commerce routes, cut back logistical hurdles, and guarantee meals safety for the area. The area can accrue advantages from Asia, Africa, and Europe via enhanced investments in infrastructure and devoted commerce corridors. International locations such because the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have already enhanced their operations to search out different routes and hook up with Asia via the Jebel Ali port, the King Abdullah port, and the Hamad port. Land connectivity within the area has additionally been strengthened by the Gulf Railway undertaking, which seeks to attach the GCC international locations (from Kuwait to Oman) and cut back reliance on maritime commerce.[115] The GCC Railway Mission can present different gateways that may cut back the time spent and wastage for perishable items by stopping congestion and cost-heavy re-routing within the area.
The undertaking may be additional built-in into the proposed financial corridors, such because the India-Center East-Europe Financial Hall (IMEC) and the Center East-Africa Hall, to make sure a cheap ship-to-rail transit community that dietary supplements the prevailing maritime and street routes between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe. The Saudi railway community is already deliberate to attach with the UAE’s Etihad Rail at Ghuwaifat, leaving a lacking hyperlink of 300 km from al-Haditha in Saudi Arabia to Haifa in Israel.[116] The mixing into proposed and present financial corridors can present dual-coast entry for African routes via not solely the UAE but additionally Saudi Arabia and Oman. The Hall can embrace devoted meals terminals that deal with grains, chilly storages, and harmonised customs.
Center-Revenue Economies
Not like high-income MENA economies, middle-income international locations similar to Djibouti, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya have weaker linkages when it comes to customs clearances and transport-related infrastructure. Aside from Egypt, different international locations within the bracket have LPI ranks decrease than 3.0 and persistently lag in clearance occasions, documentation, and predictability.[117]
On the customs clearance finish, quick lanes and single-window programs may be constructed to supply quicker clearances. Sanitary and Phytosanitary certificates (SPS) may be digitalised to permit a faster paperless clearance process. Additional, middle-income MENA international locations can leverage inland meals corridors, permitting economies to cushion maritime shocks. The 90-km-long Djibouti Regional Financial Hall (DREC) connects Djibouti to Ethiopia and is essential in making certain meals safety for the nation.[118] The functioning hall can improve sourcing diversification for different MENA international locations and be prolonged to Egypt as a bridge hub, connecting Pink Sea ports to the Mediterranean area. Equally, grain ports, inland clearance hubs, silos and SPS testing amenities may be constructed alongside North Africa, catering to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.
Low-Revenue Economies
For low-income MENA international locations like Yemen and Syria, LPI scores are among the many lowest globally, which interprets into greater prices and longer transit occasions. Each Yemen and Syria are closely reliant on imports to fulfill the demand for meals; thus, it turns into extra essential for the economies to make sure sturdy provide chains for agricultural items. In Yemen, extreme conflicts within the area have led to the destruction of cranes on the Al Hodeidah port and a ban on industrial containers.[119] This diverted transport visitors to Aden, which has not solely added stress on a single port and double taxation but additionally underutilisation of different ports.
The long-term answer lies in restoring the international locations’ logistics infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs), which may mobilise personal capital when budgets are restricted. This consists of viability funding the place capex is publicly funded and the terminals and meals storage nodes are run privately beneath lease to stabilise operations. In 2025, Syria signed an settlement value US$800 million with a UAE-based logistics firm to rebuild the nation’s maritime infrastructure, improve modernisation of terminal operations, streamline cargo dealing with, and facilitate smoother commerce.[120] The answer, nevertheless, requires added efforts in direction of mediation to make sure the protected motion of products and elimination of import restrictions on the Yemeni and Syrian ports.
3. Leverage market-based devices to handle value and provide volatility.
Commodity markets are thought-about essential in figuring out value transparency, enhancing product high quality, lowering market threat, and lowering transaction prices.[121] Within the MENA area, only some international locations have commodity exchanges for agricultural items—together with the Egyptian Commodity Change (Egycomex) and the Iran Mercantile Change. The institution of a MENA Commodity Change can profit from higher value alerts, threat transfers, and standardised contracts.
For a number of MENA international locations, meals wastage comes from a scarcity of storage and logistics; a structured commodity trade can crowd-in funding to warehouses and meet high quality requirements. The warehouse receipt system permits saved agricultural commodities to function collateral in opposition to monetary devices. The system allows farmers to make gross sales all year long as a substitute of a specific season. It additionally permits governments to acquire from licensed warehouses quicker throughout a disaster. For big importers, hich embrace most MENA international locations—exchanges via the derivatives markets present administration of value threat throughout value spikes. Malawi is an instance of how an import-reliant nation mitigated meals safety dangers through the use of hedging devices. The nation purchased bodily name choices for maize, which enabled value safety and supply of 60,000 metric tons of maize throughout value spikes.[122] The commodity trade markets, nevertheless, require an efficient regulatory mechanism to stop market manipulation.[123] Thus, constructing commodity exchanges requires MENA economies to have a strong and steady regulatory mechanism in place. Different challenges related to utilising value mechanisms embrace a scarcity of economic information, technical capability and bodily infrastructure.
Conclusion
The MENA area’s arid atmosphere and restricted arable land drive restricted home meals manufacturing, leading to a reliance on meals imports to fulfill native demand.[124] This import dependence renders the area weak to geopolitical and environmental pressures. MENA’s comparatively low rating on the World Meals Safety Index for adaptation and sustainable improvement additional underscores the necessity to construct holistic meals system resilience methods.[125] Given the variability of meals provide chain shocks, enterprise a proactive strategy is essential to mitigate short-term impacts and safeguard long-term meals safety. This consists of optimising climate-resilient meals manufacturing the place relevant, enabling meals entry via structured social insurance policies, and strengthening meals commerce corridors, storage, and infrastructure to enrich home meals availability.
In anticipation of shocks, growing meals availability and vitamin may be completed by reallocating capital in direction of R&D for drought-resistant and nutritious crop varieties, harnessing digital water commerce in high- and middle-income MENA international locations, and investing in climate-smart agriculture in arable middle-income economies. In lower- to middle-income conflict-affected international locations, pre-emptively growing focused and sturdy social security internet insurance policies to enhance entry, particularly amongst weak refugee teams, is essential. Furthermore, sustaining native financial actions amidst battle, along with money transfers, would assist preserve meals entry.
Meals provide chains may be protected and enhanced by enhancing infrastructure, which may permit dependable flows, affordability, much less spoilage, and stability. MENA economies should spend money on the digitalisation of port operations, establish different routes to minimise time, combine into inter-regional commerce corridors, and leverage inland transportation via the GCC Railway Mission. Devoted fashionable meals terminals with grain dealing with, chilly storage, and harmonised customs can additional clean the provision chains. Focus may be laid on strengthening customs clearance and leveraging viability funding with public-private partnerships to rebuild and operationalise commerce infrastructure. Commodity Exchanges are related for the area to fight value dangers and stop meals wastage. The efforts, nevertheless, should be supplemented with sturdy regulatory frameworks and sturdy infrastructure. Regardless of the area’s excessive import dependence, focused efforts can strengthen MENA international locations’ responses and mitigate meals insecurity throughout meals provide chain shocks.
Shruti Jain is Affiliate Fellow, Centre for Growth Research, ORF.
Leigh Mante is Junior Fellow, Power and Local weather Change Programme, ORF Center East.
All views expressed on this publication are solely these of the authors, and don’t characterize the Observer Analysis Basis, both in its entirety or its officers and personnel.
Endnotes
[a] In March 2026, america attacked a desalination plant in southern Iran, and Iran retaliated by attacking a desalination facility in Bahrain.
[b] Outlined as agriculture’s share of presidency expenditure divided by agriculture’s value-added share of GDP.
[c] The GCC international locations are the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.
[d] Some 40 % of MENA’s present meals necessities is being equipped by imports.
[e] This idea refers back to the quantity of water used within the manufacturing of traded agricultural items and explains the quantity of water not directly traded between international locations.
[f] The GCC’s most lively Sovereign Wealth Funds embrace the Saudi Public Funding Fund, the Qatar Funding Authority, the Abu Dhabi Funding Authority, Mubadala, ADQ, and the Kuwait Funding Authority.
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